Anneli Xie
Profs. Nikhil Rao & Lidwien Kapteijns
HIST 367: The Indian Ocean as African, Arab, and South Asian History
2020/11/05
Profs. Nikhil Rao & Lidwien Kapteijns
HIST 367: The Indian Ocean as African, Arab, and South Asian History
2020/11/05
Reading response 1 – sessions 2, 3, and 4
Session #2 – The Indian Ocean and Portuguese Sea-borne Empire
Michael Pearson’s chapter introduces the Portuguese arrival in the Indian Ocean, establishing their naval dominance through – in Pearson’s view – unnecessary violence, in order to monopolize and control trade in the region. I think the following quote exemplifies both aspects of his argument clearly:
This quote is very revealing. It admits the distrust of the Portuguese by the local rulers in the region, it acknowledges the naval dominance of the Portuguese (having “some fifty” coastal forts) (Pearson 1976, 31) , and it displays the Portuguese’s nonchalance in using violence to fulfill their wishes. Pearson argues that all three lead to the empire’s eventual dismemberment, founded on greediness and – because of their presence being inherently guided by crusading – an unwillingness to be present among the other forces in the Indian Ocean as equals.
To expand upon Pearson’s argument of the Portuguese wanting to monopolize and control trade – as well as of the Portuguese greediness – an exploration of the cartaz system, which “produced their greatest impact on Asian trade,” (Pearson 1976, 40) is appropriate. The following quote is fitting:
Not only did all ships need to have a cartaz,but they could only be issued by the Portuguese authorities. This meant that all ships had to dock at the Portuguese forts and that the Portuguese thus got first access to trade goods at favorable prices, were paid tax, and could force goods to be traded only at Portuguese forts. Because of these restrictions, the Portuguese could monopolize on trade in the region. Further to their greediness, Pearson later explains that even if a ship had cartaz, it could still be seized if terms were broken.
Lastly, Pearson argues that there was were several gaps that made the Portuguese’s presence in the Indian Ocean appear more powerful than it was, and which eventually caused the empire to fall. An example can be seen in the copper trade:
Importantly, the trade to the Red Sea was initially banned due to it being a Muslim area. With Pearson’s argument of the Portuguese having a clear crusading mission, the Red Sea blockade is an important example. In this quote, Pearson reveals that copper found its way through the Portuguese blockade because corruption and evasion were common. This, in turn, is exemplary in showing how the Portuguese trade in the Indian Ocean after a while took on a spirit of its own, in the end moving further and further away from serving its original intent.
Session #3 – The Indian Ocean in the 17th and 18 Century: Goa, Surat & Kachchh
Ashin Das Gupta’s chapter speaks to the dominance of the Gujarati merchants (over European traders) in the Red Sea trade in the 18th century. Gupta argues that European traders could not compete with the Gujarati and therefore were not a significant factor in the decline of the Gujarati’s trade. While he explains that this had to do with the trade of different goods (coffee and textiles), it also had to do with skill and economic policy, as exemplified here:
This quote reveals dependency on the Gujarati by the Europeans, which the Gujarati accepted because they could offload dangerous homeward journeys onto the Europeans, therefore transporting money safely while maintaining an upper hand in trade. Because the Gujaratis also spent less money on ammunition, employees, and were “more expert at smuggling,” they could carry on even when low prices characterized the market, and when the European trade suffered accordingly.
A lot of the skillfulness that the Gujaratis held can be attributed to the Banias, who controlled much of the commerce in the region:
Despite announcing the Bania’s economic importance in Mocha – controlling the trade according to their own Bania calendar and having their own currency, the Bania dollar – Gupta also points to the intolerance of the Banias in the “heartland of Islam” in this quote. While ascribing the merchants in the 18th century Red Sea with diversity, Gupta likewise points to Islam being the dominant framework in the region and that discrimination on the basis of religion was still very prevalent. Since his main argument is that Europeans had no chance on the Gujarati merchants, it is important to recognize the Banias, who held significant economic power; and instead of Europeans worsening the trade for the Gujarati merchants, Gupta argues that it was brought upon them by the Gujaratis themselves, following a claim for higher taxes as demand was decreasing. Gupta explains of the Gujarati merchants:
Because the group of Gujarati merchants was composed of people with diverse ethnic and geographic origins, Gupta argues that, even if European traders could not compete, the Gujarati merchants saw themselves “as competitors rather than fellow merchants.” (Gupta 1994, 138-139) Because of the Muslim rule, as elaborated upon in quote #2, Gujarati Hindus were treated especially poorly. This failure to collaborate, both between the Gujarati merchants themselves, as well as with the Muslim rule, eventually made the Gujarati trade erode.
Session #4: The Indian Ocean in the 17th & 18th Century: South Africa
In Robert Shell’s essay, he argues that “most of today’s descendants of the premodern, immigrant South African population do not know from whence they came.” (Shell 1994, 11) He claims that this was due to the oceanic slave trade bringing peoples from vastly different geographic and cultural origins together, eventually forming a unified culture at the Cape through the process of creolization. Both aspects are encompassed in this quote:
The complexity of creolization that Shell argues for can be derived from changing shipping patterns, commercial alliances, and changing rivalries resulting in “importation” of enslaved peoples from Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Madagascar, the Mascarenes, and east Africa. The mixture of different people and the cultural heterogeneity that prevailed, Shell argues, delayed the process of forming a unified culture, especially as stereotyping by origin was perpetuated for the colonialists’ own gain. Shell writes:
Shell argues that language barriers prevented enslaved peoples from sharing a culture, and thus also from organizing against their oppressors, which was favorable for the latter. Therefore, slave owners often sought to diversify the enslaved peoples that they brought into their household. This was often done on the basis of stereotyping, which Shell also explains as determining the occupations and perceived expertise of enslaved peoples. Thus, because of the prevalence and belief of these stereotypes – and the slave owners wish to “diversify” the population of enslaved people for protection – Shell argues that the process of creolization was delayed, complex, and very diverse. He writes:
The formation of a lingua franca, of course, was very important in forming what Shell deems a unified slave culture. In this quote, he opposes the common belief that Afrikaans derives solely from Dutch and explains that it has a mixture of different roots – for example in Malayo-Portuguese and Indian – all deriving from the diverse slave population of the Cape. Continuing to prove his point, he reveals that the first book in Afrikaans was written by a Muslim individual of enslaved descent. However, while Shell briefly mentions that “Afrikaners avoid admitting the creole origins of the language,” (Shell 1994, 31) he fails to shed light on the repurposing of Afrikaans, by white Afrikaner, under the Apartheid. I hope this is something that we can address and further discuss in class.
Gupta, Ashin Das. “Gujarati Merchants and the Red Sea Trade, 1700–1725,” in Merchants
of Maritime India 1500–1800. Aldenshot, Hampshire: Variorum, 1994.
Pearson, Michael. Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to the Portugese in the Sixteenth Century. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
Shell, Robert, C.H. “The Tower of Babel: The Slave Trade and Creolization at the Cape, 1652–1834,” in Slavery in South Africa, Captive Labor on the Dutch Frontier. Edited by Elizabeth A. Eldredge and Fred Morton. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
Michael Pearson’s chapter introduces the Portuguese arrival in the Indian Ocean, establishing their naval dominance through – in Pearson’s view – unnecessary violence, in order to monopolize and control trade in the region. I think the following quote exemplifies both aspects of his argument clearly:
The Portugese viceroy wrote to the sultan of Gujarat asking him to make Khwaja Safar demolish this fort, “[…] because if he was a true friend of the king of Portugal, he would not build forts on the edge of the sea, which belonged to the Portugese, and because no one was ever going to attack him from the sea except the king of Portugal. (Pearson 1976, 42)
This quote is very revealing. It admits the distrust of the Portuguese by the local rulers in the region, it acknowledges the naval dominance of the Portuguese (having “some fifty” coastal forts) (Pearson 1976, 31) , and it displays the Portuguese’s nonchalance in using violence to fulfill their wishes. Pearson argues that all three lead to the empire’s eventual dismemberment, founded on greediness and – because of their presence being inherently guided by crusading – an unwillingness to be present among the other forces in the Indian Ocean as equals.
To expand upon Pearson’s argument of the Portuguese wanting to monopolize and control trade – as well as of the Portuguese greediness – an exploration of the cartaz system, which “produced their greatest impact on Asian trade,” (Pearson 1976, 40) is appropriate. The following quote is fitting:
A cash security had to be left at the fort where the cartaz was issued to guarantee that the ship would in fact return to pay duties there on its homeward voyage. […] Turks and Abyssinian Muslims, both regarded as enemies of the Portuguese, were not to be carried, and various goods were also forbidden – among them all spices and pepper, iron, copper, and wood. (Pearson 1976, 41)
Not only did all ships need to have a cartaz,but they could only be issued by the Portuguese authorities. This meant that all ships had to dock at the Portuguese forts and that the Portuguese thus got first access to trade goods at favorable prices, were paid tax, and could force goods to be traded only at Portuguese forts. Because of these restrictions, the Portuguese could monopolize on trade in the region. Further to their greediness, Pearson later explains that even if a ship had cartaz, it could still be seized if terms were broken.
Lastly, Pearson argues that there was were several gaps that made the Portuguese’s presence in the Indian Ocean appear more powerful than it was, and which eventually caused the empire to fall. An example can be seen in the copper trade:
Thus in 1513 the king was informed that copper was worth its weight in gold in India, as thanks to the Portuguese blockade, none was now coming through from the Red Sea. A year later copper was reported to be extremely plentiful and cheap in Div. Many ships laden with it had recently arrived from the Red Sea […]. (Pearson 1976, 51)
Importantly, the trade to the Red Sea was initially banned due to it being a Muslim area. With Pearson’s argument of the Portuguese having a clear crusading mission, the Red Sea blockade is an important example. In this quote, Pearson reveals that copper found its way through the Portuguese blockade because corruption and evasion were common. This, in turn, is exemplary in showing how the Portuguese trade in the Indian Ocean after a while took on a spirit of its own, in the end moving further and further away from serving its original intent.
Session #3 – The Indian Ocean in the 17th and 18 Century: Goa, Surat & Kachchh
Ashin Das Gupta’s chapter speaks to the dominance of the Gujarati merchants (over European traders) in the Red Sea trade in the 18th century. Gupta argues that European traders could not compete with the Gujarati and therefore were not a significant factor in the decline of the Gujarati’s trade. While he explains that this had to do with the trade of different goods (coffee and textiles), it also had to do with skill and economic policy, as exemplified here:
The Dutch and English financed their purchases of coffee to a large extent by borrowing money from merchants at Mocha and paying them at Surat. Gujarati merchants usually availed themselves of this method to remit their profits back to Gujarat, thus avoiding risks at sea and the customs at Mocha and Surat. (Gupta 1994, 137)
This quote reveals dependency on the Gujarati by the Europeans, which the Gujarati accepted because they could offload dangerous homeward journeys onto the Europeans, therefore transporting money safely while maintaining an upper hand in trade. Because the Gujaratis also spent less money on ammunition, employees, and were “more expert at smuggling,” they could carry on even when low prices characterized the market, and when the European trade suffered accordingly.
A lot of the skillfulness that the Gujaratis held can be attributed to the Banias, who controlled much of the commerce in the region:
The curious paradox of economic importance and social inferiority was reflected in the manner of living of the Gujarati Banias. […] The Bania merchants of the Yemeni cities and the Habash ports controlled much of the commercial life of the area but, in Yemen at any rate, they lived like second-class citizens. (Gupta 1994, 132)
Despite announcing the Bania’s economic importance in Mocha – controlling the trade according to their own Bania calendar and having their own currency, the Bania dollar – Gupta also points to the intolerance of the Banias in the “heartland of Islam” in this quote. While ascribing the merchants in the 18th century Red Sea with diversity, Gupta likewise points to Islam being the dominant framework in the region and that discrimination on the basis of religion was still very prevalent. Since his main argument is that Europeans had no chance on the Gujarati merchants, it is important to recognize the Banias, who held significant economic power; and instead of Europeans worsening the trade for the Gujarati merchants, Gupta argues that it was brought upon them by the Gujaratis themselves, following a claim for higher taxes as demand was decreasing. Gupta explains of the Gujarati merchants:
They had but one intention: to pay as little as possible for permission to carry on their commerce. They did not, however, act as one common body to protect their interests. Whatever may be have been said about Gujarati mercantile organizations, the evidence indicates that the Gujaratis had not evolved institutions to take care of their common interests. (Gupta 1994, 138-139)
Because the group of Gujarati merchants was composed of people with diverse ethnic and geographic origins, Gupta argues that, even if European traders could not compete, the Gujarati merchants saw themselves “as competitors rather than fellow merchants.” (Gupta 1994, 138-139) Because of the Muslim rule, as elaborated upon in quote #2, Gujarati Hindus were treated especially poorly. This failure to collaborate, both between the Gujarati merchants themselves, as well as with the Muslim rule, eventually made the Gujarati trade erode.
Session #4: The Indian Ocean in the 17th & 18th Century: South Africa
In Robert Shell’s essay, he argues that “most of today’s descendants of the premodern, immigrant South African population do not know from whence they came.” (Shell 1994, 11) He claims that this was due to the oceanic slave trade bringing peoples from vastly different geographic and cultural origins together, eventually forming a unified culture at the Cape through the process of creolization. Both aspects are encompassed in this quote:
Thus a changing slave trade, which imported many languages and cultures into the Cape, set in motion a complicated demographic and cultural creolization process that transformed the whole colony. (Shell, 12)
The complexity of creolization that Shell argues for can be derived from changing shipping patterns, commercial alliances, and changing rivalries resulting in “importation” of enslaved peoples from Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Madagascar, the Mascarenes, and east Africa. The mixture of different people and the cultural heterogeneity that prevailed, Shell argues, delayed the process of forming a unified culture, especially as stereotyping by origin was perpetuated for the colonialists’ own gain. Shell writes:
Slave owners fostered stereotypes that reinforced cultural and linguistic differences among slaves in their households. Owning slaves of various origins who spoke mutually unintelligible languages certainly posed problems of communication […] but this domestic Babylon had other advantages – such as security. Too many slaves of the same origin in one holding increased the risk of flight or rebellion. (Shell, 20)
Shell argues that language barriers prevented enslaved peoples from sharing a culture, and thus also from organizing against their oppressors, which was favorable for the latter. Therefore, slave owners often sought to diversify the enslaved peoples that they brought into their household. This was often done on the basis of stereotyping, which Shell also explains as determining the occupations and perceived expertise of enslaved peoples. Thus, because of the prevalence and belief of these stereotypes – and the slave owners wish to “diversify” the population of enslaved people for protection – Shell argues that the process of creolization was delayed, complex, and very diverse. He writes:
The simplification and creolization of Dutch in early South Africa resulted, not from the spontaneous development of Dutch dialects, as early Afrikaans-speaking scholars have fondly argued, but from the domestic interaction among imported, creole, and autochtonous slaves and servants, and their owners. (Shell 1994, 29)
The formation of a lingua franca, of course, was very important in forming what Shell deems a unified slave culture. In this quote, he opposes the common belief that Afrikaans derives solely from Dutch and explains that it has a mixture of different roots – for example in Malayo-Portuguese and Indian – all deriving from the diverse slave population of the Cape. Continuing to prove his point, he reveals that the first book in Afrikaans was written by a Muslim individual of enslaved descent. However, while Shell briefly mentions that “Afrikaners avoid admitting the creole origins of the language,” (Shell 1994, 31) he fails to shed light on the repurposing of Afrikaans, by white Afrikaner, under the Apartheid. I hope this is something that we can address and further discuss in class.
References
Pearson, Michael. Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to the Portugese in the Sixteenth Century. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
Shell, Robert, C.H. “The Tower of Babel: The Slave Trade and Creolization at the Cape, 1652–1834,” in Slavery in South Africa, Captive Labor on the Dutch Frontier. Edited by Elizabeth A. Eldredge and Fred Morton. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.